Risk and the Fog of War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23435708 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kenneth Payne (0000-0002-4688-9285, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Pages | 143-164 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-15 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Psychology of Strategy (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190227234.003.0006 |
| OpenAlex | W2505044035 |
| ISBN | 9780190227234 |
| Language | EN |
Strategy entails making judgements about risk and probability. Humans depart from theoretical rationality in gauging risk in a number of ways, including exaggerating the likelihood of low-probability but highly vivid events. They also overestimate their own capacity to influence events, via an optimism bias. Additionally, they are inclined to be much more tolerant of risk when they perceive themselves to be losing, relative to some goal. Lastly, their emotions at the time they make a decision shape their appetite for risk. These tendencies are explored in the context of Vietnam by considering, among other episodes, Defense Secretary McNamara’s change of mind on the war and President Nixon’s approach to bombing.
Geography · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Environmental Science
| Highly cited | No |
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