Imposing Risk

A Normative Framework

Bibliographic Data

ID23486705
AuthorsJohn Oberdiek (0000-0003-2143-1072, corresponding author)
Year2017
Pages235
Publication date2017-10-19
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueImposing Risk (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780199594054.003.0002
OpenAlexW4234857579
Open LibraryOL28476645M
ISBN9780199594054
LanguageEN
Citations received9

Any normative framework of risk imposition must include at its foundation an account of the nature of risk imposition. If risk is understood as the probability of a bad event or harm, the menu of conceptions of risk would seem to be exhausted by the various accounts of probability that have been developed. The two main families of probability theory, objective and subjective, have opposite strengths and weaknesses as candidate conceptions of probability suitable for a normative framework of risk imposition. This chapter argues that objective accounts are suitably normative but insufficiently practical, while unreconstructed subjective accounts are suitably practical but insufficiently normative, and this casts doubt on the project of identifying a conception of risk that is suitable for a normative framework of risk imposition.

Actuarial science · Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Foundation (evidence) · Harm · Normative · Political science · Risk analysis (engineering) · Risk assessment · Computer Science · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Risk Perception and Management · Social Psychology · Risk

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