That We Obey Rules Blindly Does Not Mean that We Are Blindly Subservient to Rules

Bibliographic Data

ID2352124
AuthorsW Sharrock (0000-0002-7029-8653), Alex Dennis (0000-0003-4625-1123, Research Centre at the University of Salford)
Year2008
Volume25
Issue2
Pages33-50
Publication date2008-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory Culture & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0263-2764 • E-ISSN: 1460-3616
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0263276407086790
OpenAlexW2123243680
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited10

Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following are rightly understood to be corrosive of the project of cognitive science. They do not, however, therefore privilege sociology as a competitor discipline - despite the protestations of some sociologists. Rules are invoked as explanatory devices in social theory, and Wittgenstein is criticized for failing to offer a conception of rule-following amenable to such uses. This reveals a misconception of how rules work, and a misunderstanding of what Wittgensteins philosophy was meant to achieve. Using Wittgenstein's own arguments about rule-following activities, in particular those concerning mathematics, we demonstrate that, first, rules do not indicate the existence of a realm independent of or superior to the mundane, everyday world, and so cannot be used to 'explain' activities with regard to such a realm. Wittgenstein's remark that rules are followed 'blindly'. therefore, cannot arbitrate between different social-theoretical understandings of what it means to follow a rule, but deals in very different debates and in very different terms

Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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