Spinozism in the Ether
Kant’s Opus Postumum
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23577902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Beth Lord (0000-0001-9068-0887, University of Dundee, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Pages | 155-174 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Kant and Spinozism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/9780230297722_8 |
| OpenAlex | W2466131117 |
| ISBN | 9780230297722 |
| Language | EN |
In this chapter I turn to Kant’s Opus Postumum , the text in which his relation to Spinozism is at its most puzzling and intriguing. In this final text, Kant appears to affirm a single material substance produced by the subject’s self-positing. This substance, the ether, is at once a material and transcendental condition of possible experience, and goes some way towards satisfying Maimon’s and Deleuze’s demand for a genetic condition of real experience. Moreover, a number of cryptic references to ‘Spinoza’s transcendental idealism’ are out of line with Kant’s usual antagonism towards Spinozism. While I will defer discussion of these references to this book’s conclusion, they raise a number of immediate questions. Did Kant see the mature form of his transcendental idealism as compatible with Spinozism, or with a materialist or idealist variant of it? Did the development of the concept of ether make him re-evaluate his attitude towards Spinoza? Does Kant truly move to a theory of the immanent production of empirical objects from a single substance? These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Epistemology · Idealism · Materialism · Relation (database) · Subject (documents) · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Transcendental philosophy · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |