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Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium

Bibliographic Data

ID23600960
AuthorsJim Duggan (0000-0001-8554-2594, University of Rochester, corresponding author), John Duggan (Economics, University of Rochester)
Year2009
Pages64-83
Publication date2009-09-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueThe Oxford handbook of political economy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0004
OpenAlexW2098222842
ISBN9780199548477
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited32

This article looks at the known foundational results on spatial models of elections. The issues of equilibrium existence, the characterization of equilibria (in terms of their social welfare properties), and the distance between equilibrium policy and positions of the candidates are examined. It then discusses the results of the case where candidates are able to give precise predictions of voters' behaviour precisely; the article also introduces the ‘Downsian model’. The article looks at two models of probabilistic voting, before finally moving on to consider the most common objective functions that are used to model the electoral incentives of different types of candidates.

Characterization (materials science) · Econometrics · Economics · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Physics · Political science · Probabilistic logic · Social choice theory · Social Welfare · Voting · Welfare · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

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Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,16
Citation span2007 - 2011 (5)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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