Where’s the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23607142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shaun Gallagher (0000-0002-3147-9929, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Pages | 108-124 |
| Publication date | 2006-02-24 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | The MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.003.0007 |
| OpenAlex | W4210465823 |
| ISBN | 9780262162371 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
This chapter argues that Benjamin Libet’s experiments did not prove whether or not we have free will because free will is a concept that does not apply to the movements investigated by Libet. By focusing on temporality and levels of description, it suggests that a distinction must be made between the initiation and control of movement, much of which is unconscious, and the conscious exercise of free will in intentional action. In particular, the chapter examines the question of whether consciousness causes behavior in the context of epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. It also looks at the reflective and perceptual theories of how movements are under conscious control.
Action (physics) · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Context (archaeology) · Control (management) · Economics · Epistemology · Free movement · Free will · Perception · Temporality · Unconscious mind · Artificial Intelligence · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.21 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2023 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |