Epistemology for Realists

Bibliographic Data

ID23616243
AuthorsSarah Mcgrath (0009-0007-7901-4040, Princeton University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Pages66-83
Publication date2023-09-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Handbook of Moral Realism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190068226.013.5
OpenAlexW4386827953
ISBN9780190068226
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

According to the moral realist, moral judgments express beliefs in objective moral facts. Moreover, moral realists tend to hold that, while we can be mistaken about morality, many of our moral beliefs amount to substantial moral knowledge. What kind of story should the realist offer in order to explain how such knowledge is achieved? One might expect that the correct answer to this question depends on whether naturalism or non-naturalism is true. But in this chapter, I argue that, irrespective of whether moral facts are natural, the most plausible epistemological story is an unexceptionalist picture on which any source of nonmoral knowledge is a potential source of moral knowledge.

Epistemology · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Morality · Naturalism · Order (exchange) · Social cognitive theory of morality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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