Agency Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23623925 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Edward J Zajac (0000-0002-4453-7147, Northwestern University, corresponding author), Edward Zajac |
| Year | 2015 |
| Pages | 1-2 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-21 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Wiley Encyclopedia of Management (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/9781118785317.weom110111 |
| OpenAlex | W4254053819 |
| ISBN | 9781118785317 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
This theory examines the problems – and partial contractual solutions ( see Contracts) – that exist when a principal delegates Decision‐Making responsibility to an agent who is paid a fee, but whose own objectives may conflict with those of the principal.
Agency (philosophy) · Business · Computer security · Corporate governance · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Principal (computer security) · Principal–agent problem · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Finance · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|