The Inscrutability of Reference

Dados Bibliográficos

ID23630657
AutoresDonald Davidson (autor correspondente)
Ano2001
Páginas227-242
Data de publicação2001-09-27
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoCHAPTER
PeriódicoInquiries into Truth and Interpretation (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditoraOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/0199246297.003.0016
OpenAlexW4245148633
ISBN9780199246298
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas54

Davidson discusses two related claims of Quine: ontological relativity and the indeterminacy of reference. By comparing these claims to the related indeterminacies of truth and logical form, he suggests how we can minimize them by investigating them from within truth theories and radical interpretation. They can be minimized to a greater degree than Quine's own framework permits, but not to the high degree a causal theory of reference claims. Davidson objects to this theory, as he had in Essay 15, on the basis that reference assignments are tested at the sentential level, and that two interpretations which agree on that level may differ however much they like about subsentential assignments. Davidson then suggests a way of formulating Quine's insights without trace of relativism (cf Essay 13).

Epistemology · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Quine · Relativism · TRACE (psycholinguistics) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science