The Demand for Sovereignty and the Emergence of Nationalism

Bibliographic Data

ID23637650
AuthorsMichael Hechter (0000-0003-2845-8147, corresponding author)
Year2001
Pages113-133
Publication date2001-08-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueContaining Nationalism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/019924751x.003.0007
OpenAlexW2484407011
ISBN9780199247516
LanguageEN
References cited236

The members of any nation would prefer to be sovereign rather than to be ruled by non‐nationals because this maximizes the chance that the government will provide them with an optimal mix of public goods. This general preference is affected by the net benefit of continued affiliation with the central authority. To the degree that the centre provides minority nationals with protection, and economic and social welfare, the demand for sovereignty will be attenuated. Hence, nationalist secession is most likely to occur in multinational states whose centres are subject to military and economic setbacks. However, the demand for sovereignty also depends on the nation's capacity to engage in collective action, which is affected by state institutions.

Collective action · Economic nationalism · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Multinational corporation · Nationalism · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public good · Secession · Sovereignty · State (computer science) · Welfare · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Religion and Society Interactions

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