Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical Foundations and the First Critique
The Empirical Concept of Matter and the Categories
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23659355 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Friedman (0000-0002-7477-563X) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Pages | 53-69 |
| Publication date | 2001-03-15 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Kant and the sciences (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/0195133056.003.0004 |
| OpenAlex | W2477894276 |
| ISBN | 9780195133059 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
This paper focuses on the relationship between the general metaphysics of the Critique of Pure Reason and the special metaphysics of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant claims that what distinguishes the latter from the former is that the latter presupposes an empirical concept, namely the concept of matter, whereas the former does not. It is argued that the concept of matter is empirical not in any ordinary sense, but in the sense that it requires actual perceptible objects to be given. Only the system of contingently given, empirical objects of the solar system as described by Newtonian physics, satisfies this requirement. This interpretation suggests that “experience”, whose possibility Kant is exploring in the first Critique, is exclusively “scientific experience”, and that the task of theoretical philosophy thus lies primarily in understanding the conceptual presuppositions of scientific experience.
Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology) · Philosophy of science · Presupposition · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · History of Science and Medicine · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.16 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2007 - 2021 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |