Tables
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23673677 |
|---|---|
| Editors | David Levi-Faur |
| Year | 2011 |
| Publication date | 2011-11-30 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4337/9780857936110.00005 |
| OpenAlex | W4376631350 |
| ISBN | 9780857936110 |
| Language | EN |
Tables 1.1 Types of third-party regulatory designs 9 5.1 Instruments of managing delegated authority 74 6.1 The regulation dilemma 87 7.1 Competing models of regulatory administration 99 7.2 Validating evidence for the models of regulatory administration 100 7.3 Basic structure of regulatory administration in four European countries, 1980-2000 105 13.1 Regulation, legal measures: a formalistic taxonomy 189 13.2The role of law in regulation: fuzzy practices 193 14.1 Operationalizing the independence of regulatory authorities 203 25.1 The universe of global private environmental ordering (partial picture) 351 27.1 Variation in performance-based regulatory regimes 377 27.2 Accountability considerations 381 28.1 Historical developments in the use of CBA in the United States regulatory process 392 29.1 Major steps in the evolution of the EU Commission's impact assessment system 399 30.1 Base VSL estimates used in US regulatory analyses 414 31.1 Categorization of regulatory institutions 424 31.2Ranking process-oriented regulation in comparison with prescriptive and outcome-oriented regulation 428 34.1 Overview of strengths and weaknesses of diff erent modes of private regulation 481 43.1 Private and public-private social standards matrix 593 43.2 Overview of main private standards certifi cation initiatives ranked by sector 597 44.1 Summarizing strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft law 609 46.1 Summary of main regulatory approaches to climate change mitigation
Computer Science · Environmental Policies and Emissions · Occupational and Professional Licensing Regulation · Regulation and Compliance Studies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|