Acting for a Good Reason

Bibliographic Data

ID23699705
AuthorsJonathan Dancy (corresponding author)
Year2002
Pages98-120
Publication date2002-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenuePractical Reality (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/0199253056.003.0005
OpenAlexW2475427997
ISBN9780199253050
LanguageEN
References cited45

Argues that motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent but (real or supposed) states of affairs. The main argument for this appeals to the normative realism established earlier. Since a reason to act (a good reason) is a state of affairs, the reasons in the light of which we act must also be capable of being states of affairs, for otherwise it would be impossible to act for a good reason. Our reasons are what we believe rather than that we so believe, or our so believing. I also consider and reject the view that our motivating reasons are the contents of our beliefs; in this context, I argue that a good reason cannot be a proposition.

Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Form of the Good · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Proposition · Realism · Sociology · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science