Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23708122 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Sobel (0000-0001-6948-7046), David M Sobel (0000-0002-6954-3623, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Pages | 16-42 |
| Publication date | 2016-11-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | From Valuing to Value (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712640.003.0002 |
| OpenAlex | W2561818327 |
| ISBN | 9780198712640 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Subjective accounts of reasons for action appear to be seriously counter-intuitive because they maintain that some possible agents lack any reason to be moral. This chapter aims to blunt that criticism of subjective accounts. In response I stress explanations for our intuitions that are compatible with subjectivism. Everyone we know has significant reasons to not brutalize the vulnerable, the subjectivist can remind us, and they can remind us how robust such reasons are for the sort of agents we are familiar with. Agents that lack subjectivist reasons to be decent to others would be profoundly alien creatures, in a variety of important ways quite unlike those agents we encounter daily. It would be less surprising if our intuitions about quite alien creatures were misleading.
Epistemology · Subjectivism · Ethics in medical practice · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |