Types of Value

This chapter introduces some contrasting notions of value, in particular final intrinsic and final extrinsic value. G. E. Moore's views on value, as well as his so‐called isolation test, are discussed. It is explained why this test might have done more bad than good to value theory. The chapter also examines the common claim that values are supervenient features. Supervenience is one of the key elements which this work employs in order to understand the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about values. The other idea at play in this discussion is that of value constitution. The discussion suggests why the claim that what is valuable for its own sake is invariant over possible worlds, does not work as a line of demarcation between subjectivists and objectivists. Once we take into consideration the fact that the supervenience base might contain non‐essential properties it becomes clear that the thesis should be rejected.

Constitution · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Objectivism · Political science · Subjectivism · Supervenience · Value (mathematics) · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

• On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes

  Open Access•Toni Rønnow‐rasmussen•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2009

  Add to list