Judicial Independence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23742209 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tom S Clark (0000-0002-3552-9161, Emory University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Pages | 1-12 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-15 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | OTHER |
| Venue | Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0195 |
| OpenAlex | W4240197146 |
| ISBN | 9781118900772 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 28 |
For analytic clarity, judicial independence is best thought of as a concept that captures a variety of features of a judicial system. One common, and useful, approach is to associate judicial independence with the ability of judges to, in practice, make decisions the outcomes of which are not dictated by extrajudicial pressures. In this spirit, research on judicial independence has examined a number of topics, two of which are (i) the origins and determinants of political support for the judiciary and (ii) the consequences of maintaining judicial independence for economic performance. Original research on political support for the judiciary focused on how a system of separation of powers can constrain judicial independence. Current research is turning the question around, examining the role courts play as a component of a system in which policy is made collectively by political institutions. Research on the relationship between judicial independence and economic performance originally examined whether greater judicial independence is associated with higher levels of economic growth. Current research is expanding the focus to evaluate the conditions under which independent courts reinforce the stability of democratic government. As research on judicial independence moves forward, it should focus on further conceptual clarification, the study of independent courts as complements to other parts of a system of governance (rather than competitors to policy makers), and leveraging current advances for theoretically driven measurement of these concepts.
CLARITY · Democracy · Independence (probability theory) · Judicial activism · Judicial discretion · Judicial Independence · Judicial opinion · Judicial review · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Mathematics
Violence and Social Orders
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Judicial Independence
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
Information and Judicial Review
Interpose Your Friendly Hand”
Unbundling Institutions
Judicial Checks and Balances
The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited
A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems
Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival
The Supreme Court in American Democracy
Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making
Institutionalism as a Methodology
The Public and the Supreme Court
Do Institutions Cause Growth
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Institutions
Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
Credible Commitment and Property Rights
The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions
| Highly cited | No |
|---|