Virtue’s Reasons

Does justified belief that acting in a certain way would be vicious furnish a reason against acting in that way? Is this a special kind of reason, distinct from other kinds of moral reason? Can it form the basis for a theory of right action? In this chapter, I explore positive answers to each of these questions. 1. Virtues, Vices, and the Moral Middle Let me set out a series of assumptions that guide my answers. Aretaic judgment takes the form of both judgment of character and judgment of action. My initial assumption is that virtues and vices are broadly structured into trichotomies. An action or a trait can be virtuous or vicious or neither virtuous nor vicious. An act of helping or of not helping might be generous or selfish, or neither generous nor selfish. We may encounter situations which force a dichotomy upon us—situations where the moral middle disappears and our actions can only be virtuous or vicious—but this is not the invariable, or even ordinary, run of things. Traits may seem to invite dichotomous judgment: that a person is either considerate of others or not considerate of them; courageous or not courageous; temperate or intemperate; a dedicated and professional colleague or a lazy, distracted and unprofessional colleague. People seem either to have integrity or to lack it. Generally, however, these cases involve an implicit third term. A person may be neither especially temperate nor especially intemperate; they may be considerate to others to a substantial degree, often, but not always, and not especially so. Integrity is something we possess in degrees.

Epistemology · Virtue · Ethics in medical practice · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

• Virtue, Environmental Ethics, Nonhuman Values, and Anthropocentrism

  Open Access•Marcello Di Paola•Philosophies•2024

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