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Resumo

This article criticizes the pragmatist theory of progress developed by Rahel Jaeggi and argues for a psychologist alternative. In her theory, Jaeggi rejects both moralist and historicist understandings of progress, arguing that progress should be regarded as a non-teleological process of experience enrichment. However, by identifying progress with problem-solving activities, Jaeggi explicitly makes a parallelist argument between social-moral and scientific progress, which is highly questionable. In this analysis, I argue that Jaeggi's analogy fails. And by referring to Kuhn's notion of incommensurability, I demonstrate a more radical, psychologist approach, which departs from any idea of experience enrichment in history. The lack of a sufficient account of progress is not the failure of Kuhn. In contrast, it is his very own insight.

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