Does Contract Disclosure Matter?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24035261 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia Marotta‐Wurgler (0000-0002-0419-2690, New York University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 168 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 94-119 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245612799440122 |
| OpenAlex | W2012067622 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
Disclosure has long been the preferred regulatory approach to prevent one-sided standard-form contract terms, but its efficacy is unclear. For disclosure to be effective, it must increase readership of contracts and, conditional on reading, affect decisions. I use clickstream data on software shoppers to test these two conditions in the online context. I find that the prominence of disclosure of a software license agreement has little effect on readership. Moreover, those who read the license are equally likely to purchase the product regardless of its one-sidedness. Mandatory online disclosure regimes thus seem unlikely to impose competitive pressure on sellers.
Actuarial science · Advertising · Affect (linguistics) · Audience measurement · Business · Clickstream · Context (archaeology) · Internet privacy · License · Political science · Product (mathematics) · Reading (process) · Test (biology) · World Wide Web · Accounting · Computer Science · Copyright and Intellectual Property · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Open Source Software Innovations · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |