An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24037370 |
|---|---|
| Authors | G Daniel (Rhodes College), M Arce, Mauricio Álvarez Arce (0000-0003-0536-5503, University of Southern California), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, University of Southern California), Todd Sandler |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 159 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 132-154 |
| Publication date | 2003-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/0932456032975096 |
| OpenAlex | W1982037221 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
This paper investigates the evolutionary equilibria of a clash of cultures game where conflict results from failures to share social power in individual pairings. Members of a general subpopulation are matched with those of a fundamentalist subpopulation, the latter being more cohesive and insistent that their identity traits define the norms for, and outcomes of, social, economic, and political interaction. Simulations of the evolutionary dynamics reveal a tradeoff between the intolerance of fundamentalism and the likelihood of a takeover. This tradeoff is reversed if fundamentalism is falsifiable: affording non-fundamentalists the ability to signal fundamentalist traits produces a bandwagon effect.
Economics · Epistemology · Fundamentalism · Mathematical economics · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2011 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |