The Economics of Empire-Building
Predatory and Price Competitions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24037832 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antoine Pietri (0000-0003-2730-2239, Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne), Mehrdad Vahabi (0000-0001-9107-9364, Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne), Tarik Tazdaït (0000-0003-4115-9512, CIRED) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 173 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 253-278 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245616x14659946859954 |
| OpenAlex | W2598062267 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
We build a theoretical framework consistent with historical evidence in which empire-building is explained by price and predatory competitions on the market for protection. We explore how the assets structure possessed by the buyers of protection influences the nature of protection and in fine the size of empires. Our main contribution is to introduce a distinction between two types of rent, namely an »absolute« and a »differential« one. The first corresponds to rents extracted by empires using threats and coercion; the second, to economic advantages conferred on subjects of an empire.
Coercion (linguistics) · Differential (mechanical device) · Economic rent · Economics · Economy · Empire · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Engineering · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2020 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |