Delegation and Information Revelation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24040575 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Axel Gautier (0000-0001-7700-3814, University of Liège), Dimitri Paolini (0000-0002-3986-3976, UCL Australia) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 163 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 574-597 |
| Publication date | 2007-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245607783243007 |
| OpenAlex | W1991567778 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
This paper analyzes, in a setup where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter, and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the first decision to the agent, his choice may indicate the information that he possesses. If the principal retains control over the second decision, discovering this information is valuable. Hence, this paper provides a new rationale for delegation: A transfer of control to the informed party can be used to discover private information.
Business · Delegation · Political science · Revelation · Theology · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Philosophy
Modern Corporation and Private Property
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Strategic Information Transmission
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Incomplete Contracts
A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership
Political Correctness
Job Market Signaling
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.09 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2015 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |