Nationale Budgethoheit und Europäische Integration

Budgetary authority is one of the core legislative powers of Germany's democratically elected federal Parliament. Under German Federal Constitutional Court precedent, European integration may not abridge the German Parliament's plenary authority over its own budget. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional any international or supranational regime under which the German government could automatically be obliged to accept debt guarantees for other European member states. As long as the federal Parliament retains the prerogative to accept such guarantees on an individual basis, however, the Federal Constitutional Court did not see any constitutional issues - so long as the aggregate amount of such guarantees does not undermine meaningful budget making. On the basis of these principles, Germany may participate in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) because it allows European member states - or at least allows Germany, which holds 27% of the voting rights - to decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will guarantee other member states' debts. Constitutional limits to the aggregate amount of these guarantees may be derived in relation to the German federal budget or the GDP. Requiring individual parliamentary consent may be a suitable way of ascertaining sufficient democratic legitimacy in the particular context of debt guarantees. However, involving parliament in a large number of individual decision-making processes may weaken the legislative branch and thereby democratic government.

Political science · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies

• European Integration Through Law

  Open Access•Andreas Voßkuhle•European Journal of Sociology•2017

  Add to list

• L'intégration par le droit » - la contribution de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale

  Open Access•Andreas Voßkuhle•Trivium•2019

  Add to list