Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24044707 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Mcgee (0000-0003-2795-5328, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 169 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 229-252 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245613x13606733821557 |
| OpenAlex | W2007909835 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
nformation makes the agent uncertain how her report influences the principal's decision. The agent's expectations regarding the principal's information and the relationship between the parties' information affect both the informativeness of communication from the agent and the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has the option to consult the agent or delegate to her.
Business · Delegation · Knowledge management · Political science · Public relations · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |