Union Power as a Reason for Europe Not to Introduce Experience Rating?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24044993 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Florian Baumann, Nikolai Stähler (0000-0001-7143-6264) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 164 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 568-585 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245608785363434 |
| OpenAlex | W2091355752 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
Theoretical economic literature dealing with the financing of unemployment insurance finds that experience rating helps to solve the externality caused by individually efficient but socially inefficient dismissals and hence reduces unemployment. This is, however, found in models where workers and firms bargain over wages individually. Introducing unionized wage bargaining - which at least in continental Europe is a defining feature of the economy - may reverse the result. This paper provides an example showing that wage setting by a monopoly union can result in an increase in unemployment.
Economics · European union · International trade · Physics · Power (physics) · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy · Psychology
Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes
Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms
The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection
The Perverse Effects of Partial Employment Protection Reform
Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment
The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |