Dados Bibliográficos

AUTOR(ES) J. McKenzie
AFILIAÇÃO(ÕES) University of Wollongong, Australia
ANO 2018
TIPO Artigo
PERIÓDICO Journal of Classical Sociology
ISSN 1468-795X
E-ISSN 1741-2897
EDITORA Annual Reviews (United States)
DOI 10.1177/1468795x17736259
ADICIONADO EM 2025-08-18
MD5 3d800cfe021210e5c43866815b08046d

Resumo

While the pursuit of happiness in the present pervades popular narratives of happiness and the good life, the work of Adorno and Arendt casts doubt on the possibility of this lucrative goal. For Adorno, happiness occurs only in memory, while Arendt is sceptical about the possibility of experience between past and future and uses happiness to demonstrate her suspicion. Meanwhile, GH Mead offers an alternative that rejects these counter-intuitive perspectives by reaffirming that all experiences necessarily take place in the present. This article will assess each of these claims alongside the view that contemporary happiness discourse favours the pragmatic notion of happiness in the present. The article will then conclude by considering the potential for Simmel's transcending theory of experience – set out in his final major work View of Life (1918) – to resolve these tensions and support a theory of time, experience, emotion and knowledge that is capable of responding to the challenges set out by Adorno, Arendt and Mead.

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