Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24049587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gregory J Werden, Luke M Froeb (0009-0009-2043-0159), Mikhael Shor (0000-0002-2027-3810) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 167 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 126-142 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245611794656426 |
| OpenAlex | W3121551314 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
Scholarship on competition policy has begun to explore the implications of learning from behavioral research and to challenge the assumption of profit maximization at the heart of neoclassical economic theory of the firm. This scholarship is briefly reviewed, focusing on merger control. Prospects for basing merger control entirely on data from actual mergers or laboratory experiments are explored. Also explored are implications of behavioral research for merger assessment in consumer-goods industries. The conclusion is that competition policy should continue to rely on neoclassical economic analysis based on the assumption of profit maximization. (JEL: K21, L41)
Business · Commission · Merger control · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Economic Theory and Institutions · Finance · Merger and Competition Analysis
The Methodology of Positive Economics
Psychology and Economics
Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle
The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining
Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games
Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory
Rational Choice
Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders
An Experimental Imperfect Market
Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
| Highly cited | No |
|---|