Intergroup Contact and Rice Allocation via a Modified Dictator Game in Rural Cameroon
Dados Bibliográficos
| AUTOR(ES) | |
|---|---|
| AFILIAÇÃO(ÕES) | University of Oxford School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, Department of Psychology, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK, Department of Informatics, Technische Universität München, Garching bei München, Germany, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
| ANO | 2013 |
| TIPO | Artigo |
| PERIÓDICO | Field Methods |
| ISSN | 1525-822X |
| E-ISSN | 1552-3969 |
| EDITORA | Annual Reviews (United States) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1525822x12466981 |
| ADICIONADO EM | 2025-08-18 |
| MD5 |
677bb13b5473547ef6b0f7d5d97f3e54
|
Resumo
Economic games in field settings have been subject to criticism concerning their ecological validity. We use social identity theory and the intergroup contact hypothesis as a framework to illustrate how economic games can be applied to field settings with higher ecological validity. A quasi-experiment in two rural Cameroonian villages studied participants' allocation of rice to co-inhabitants of their village. The villages are characterized by different degrees of contact between the ethnic groups and the sexes. Our results indicate that women who are segregated from each other disadvantage other women more than men or women who experience higher amounts of contact. These findings are interesting from a theoretical and methodological perspective since we utilized a nonmonetary stake in naturalistic intergroup settings.