The green nexum

Collateral, clan finance and the moral economy of repo markets

Datos Bibliográficos

ID24142159
AutoresAlessandro Maresca (0000-0003-4407-5672, University of Bologna, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Páginas1-23
Fecha de publicación2026-09-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomy and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0308-5147 • E-ISSN: 1469-5766
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03085147.2026.2705773
OpenAlexW7211942788
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas23

This paper analyses the attempted greening of repurchase agreement (repo) markets through the figure of the ‘green nexum’. Repos are not green in themselves: collateral normally matters insofar as it is liquid, eligible and reusable. Drawing on critical macro-finance, social studies of finance and anthropological theories of exchange, the paper argues that repo markets are not neutral financial ‘plumbing’ but a Braudelian antimarket: an elite, state-entangled formation above ordinary market exchange. The circulation of collateral produces a distinct sociality, binding dealer banks, central banks and asset managers into ranked chains of obligation. Based on fieldwork in international industry standard-setting forums, green-finance training and interviews, the paper shows how green repo attempts to moralize, yet reproduces, collateral-based finance.

Clan · Financial market · Money market · Moral economy · African studies and sociopolitical issues · Agriculture, Land Use, Rural Development · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion