Shared and Institutional Agency
Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24148946 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael E Bratman (0000-0001-9424-3537, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-19 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Shared and Institutional Agency (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780197580899.001.0001 |
| ISBN | 9780197580899 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 86 |
Our human lives involve remarkable forms of practical organization: diachronic organization of individual activity, small-scale organization of shared action, and the organization of institutions. A theory of human action should help us understand these multiple forms of human practical organization and their interrelations. This book argues that a key is our capacity for planning agency. Drawing on earlier work on the roles of planning agency in the cross-temporal and small-scale social organization of our agency, this book focuses on the role of our planning agency within our organized institutions. It draws on ideas, inspired by H. L. A. Hart, that our organized institutions are rule-guided, and that to understand this we need a theory of social rules. This book draws on the planning theory of shared intention and the underlying theory of plan rationality to understand social rules. It understands an organized institution as involving authority-according social rules of procedure. It provides a model of organized institutions that makes room for pluralistic divergence. This leads to a model of institutional intention and—drawing on ideas from Harry Frankfurt—institutional intentional agency. The account charts a path between views of, among others, Kirk Ludwig, Philip Pettit, and Scott Shapiro. It sees our capacity for planning agency as a core capacity that underlies not only string quartets and informal social rules but also, thereby, the rule-guided structure of organized institutions and institutional agency. And it supports adjustments in views of mind, intention, and agency that are built into Donald Davidson’s field-shaping work.
Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Epistemology · Institution · Political science · Public relations · Rationality · Social science · Sociology · Structure and agency · Law · Political and Social Issues · Political Economy and Marxism · Urban Planning and Landscape Design
Ideal Theory in Social Ontology as Ideology
Explaining the Cultural Evolution of large-scale Collaboration
Enactivist social ontology
Three strategies for shared intention
Group identification, joint attention, and preferences
Varieties of collective action
Social Change, Solidarity, and Mass Agency
Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory
Exchange and solidarity
Planning and Its Function in Our Lives
How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's ‘Core Capacity Thesis’ and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences
Inequality in Planning Capacity
Functionalisms and the Philosophy of Action
The Contours of Corporate Moral Agency
Social Systems as Moral Agents
Corporate Sincerity
Quasi Formal Approach to the Method of Cases
Social Normativity and Social Reasons
Ghosting in the Job Market
In Praise of Collective Agents
Autonomous agency, we‐agency, and social oppression
States’ culpability through time
From group to institutional agency
Collective action, work, and partial plans
Modeling the Normativity of Joint Commitments
Grounding the diasporic turn in political theory
How can members of large, complex groups know the group’s attitudes
Boundary objects, trading zones, and stigmergy
The epistemic vices of corporations
The moral failures of collective agents
Explaining collective agency
The Transmission of Knowledge via Large-Scale Technology
Mopping the Floors or Putting a Man on the Moon? Self‐Narrative and the Scope of Individual Moral Responsibility for Collective Actions
The Method of Truth in Metaphysics
Thought and Talk
Deception and Division
Valuing and the Will
Shared Agency
Understanding Institutions
What Happens When Someone Acts?
The meaning of ‘meaning’
Psychological Predicates
Shared intention and personal intentions
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals
Social Choice and Individual Values
Social Rules
Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus
Three Theories of Self-Governance
“We’ll see you in court!”
Internal and external reasons
Rationality Through Reasoning
Representing collective agency
Shared Intention, Organized Institutions
Group Agency and Individualism
Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Massively Shared Agency
Institutions and Collective Intentionality
Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms
A Planning Theory of Acting Together
The Contours of Corporate Moral Agency
Action and Rationalization
Twitter and Tear Gas
Collective Intentions and Actions
Planning, Time, and Self-Governance
Planning on a Prior Intention
Essays on Actions and Events
Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance
What is a Social Practice
Norms that Make a Difference
Joint Actions and Group Agents
Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
On Knowledge and Convention
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments
A planning theory of self-governance
Agency, Time, and Sociality
Individualism and the Mental
Against quietist normative realism
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
Fraternity
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
A Unified Social Ontology
Corporate Moral Responsibility
Shared Agency in Modest Sociality
Modest Sociality
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 11 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |