The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24206365 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen (0000-0002-5265-1484) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Pages | 168 |
| Publication date | 2014-12-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | The Arrow Impossibility Theorem (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Columbia University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.7312/mask15328 |
| ISBN | 9780231153287 |
| Open Library | OL26855336M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal -- given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Mathematical models · Probabilities · Social choice · Voting
Toward a Human-Centered Economy and Politics
Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice
The emergence of social choice at the Cowles Commission, 1948–1952
Majority decision and Condorcet winners
The Political Economy of Media Capabilities
Démocratie de la demande versus démocratie de l’offre
From disenchantment to renewal
On Attempts to Gerrymander “Positive” and “Normative” Political Theory
Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
The Death of Welfare Economics
| Citations per year | 0.91 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2024 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |