Extended trade dependence, alliance network centrality, and conflict initiation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24225173 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Quan Li (0000-0003-4734-7709, Texas A&M University), Han‐Sul Yang (0000-0003-0171-688X) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 193-213 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-23 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopres/xjaf030 |
| OpenAlex | W7128703776 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 41 |
According to the idea of extended dependence (Chen, 2021), in a directed dyad setting, a challenger’s trade dependence on a target’s defensive allies decreases the likelihood that the challenger initiates military conflict. The deterrence works because the target’s allies are both willing and able to impose severe economic punishment on the challenger. We refine this argument by introducing conditional extended dependence. We argue that for extended dependence to deter a potential challenger ex ante, the target’s allies must overcome two challenges. First, the potential challenger must believe those allies would credibly follow through with the threat of sufficiently harmful economic punishment. Second, the target’s allies successfully coordinate collective action to prevent the challenger from finding substitute markets. Extended dependence is more likely to fulfill these conditions when a “significant” state is centrally positioned within the target’s alliance network and exerts substantial leverage over other allies. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that extended dependence deters Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) initiations conditionally between 1951 and 2012, but unconditionally from 1870 to 1950. We trace this distinction to changes in the alliance system over time and to the declining reliability of defensive alliances, necessitating collective action among allies for deterrence to work in the post-1950 period.
alliance coordination · Collective action · defensive alliances · Deterrence · militarized interstate disputes · trade dependence · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance
Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war
Trading Data
Does third-party trade reduce conflict? Credible signaling versus opportunity costs
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
The Geography of the International System
The Strong, the Weak, and the Honored
Weaponized Interdependence
Wartime Commercial Policy and Trade between Enemies
Naval Power and Effects of Third-Party Trade on Conflict
Democratic Compromise
Cold War to Cold Peace
State Power and the Structure of International Trade
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
International Institutions and Economic Sanctions
Trade Concentration and Interstate Conflict
Extended Dependence
Multilateral Trade and Militarized Conflict
Careful Commitments
Trade Still Follows the Flag
Back to the Future
War and Third-party Trade
Conflict and Trade
The Study of Interdependence and Conflict
Deterrence and power
Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations, and the Kantian Peace
Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts
An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816–2001
Alliance Reliability in Times of War
Revisiting Reputation
Investing in the Peace
Alliances and Asymmetry
Economic Interdependence
Third-party trade, political similarity, and dyadic conflict
Trade networks and the Kantian peace
Alliance networks and trade
| Highly cited | No |
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