Why No One Has Implemented the Turing Test
Identifying Turing’s Design and Putting it into Practice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24225393 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Diane Proudfoot (0000-0002-9736-4489, University of Canterbury), Sharon Temtsin (0000-0002-2819-6821, University of Canterbury), Christoph Bartneck (0000-0003-4566-4815, University of Canterbury) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-20 |
| Publication date | 2026-10-14 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/psa.2026.10282 |
| OpenAlex | W7221720811 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 62 |
In October 1950, Alan Turing proposed that a machine’s success in an imitation game provides a criterion for thinking. Turing’s test became one of the philosophical foundations of AI, but three-quarters of a century later, it is widely claimed that generative AI models pass the test, rendering it obsolete. Our aim here is to establish definitively Turing’s conceptual design for his game. We argue that influential interpretations of Turing’s design are mistaken, with the consequence that his test has not been passed. We also present the results of carrying out, for the first time, Turing’s experiment as he proposed it.
Alan Turing · generative AI · machine intelligence · philosophy of artificial intelligence · Turing test · Artificial Intelligence Applications · Cybernetics and Technology in Society · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said To Think? (1952)
Lecture on the Automatic Computing Engine (1947)
Can Digital Computers Think? (1951)
Intelligent Machinery (1948)
Climbing towards NLU
I.—computing Machinery and Intelligence
Beyond symbol processing
The Moral Turing Test
Turing’s Test vs the Moral Turing Test
Psychologism and Behaviorism
Mindlike Behaviour in Artefacts
| Highly cited | No |
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