Legal Principles

In the third book of his Annals , Tacitus interrupts his account of Tiberius’ reign to present an extensive digression on Roman legal history, beginning with humanity’s earliest days during the proverbial ‘Golden Age’, and ending in the Early Principate. This article posits that the passage is central to our understanding of Tacitus’ legal thinking, and suggests that his handling of existing narrative traditions allows him to present a notably sceptical approach to the law. By comparing Tacitus’ account of Roman legal history to that of other authors, and placing it within the wider context of legal themes within his work, it becomes clear that he presents the law not as an inherently civilizing force but rather as a potential tool for oppression. However, this does not mean that the legal excursus amounts to little more than a straightforward narrative of legal decline: Tacitus introduces a number of strategic ‘bright spots’, suggesting that, while the law is always in danger of becoming repressive, it can in fact be used for good—although this beneficial use is aspirational rather than self-evident, and is in danger of being undermined by many different parts of Roman society.

Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Legal Studies and Society