From Prague Spring to Ukraine War
Enduring Constraints on Russian Intelligence Effectiveness in Armed Conflicts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24237691 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mikhail Polianskii (0000-0003-1940-8877, Research Department International Institutions, Leibniz Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (PRIF), Frankfurt, Germany) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-25 |
| Publication date | 2026-10-21 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Communist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920 |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1525/cpcs.2026.3008108 |
| OpenAlex | W7223155905 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
Why do Russian foreign intelligence services repeatedly fall short of delivering the political and strategic outcomes expected by the Kremlin, a pattern made most visible in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine? This article argues that these shortcomings stem not from episodic misjudgments but from enduring operational and structural constraints that have shaped Soviet and Russian intelligence practice over several decades. Through a comparative analysis of three cases—the events leading up to Prague Spring (1968), the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979), and Russian operations in Ukraine (2014–22)—this study demonstrates the persistence of three tendencies: fragmented organizational arrangements that undermine coordination and intensify inter-service competition, systematic misreadings of local political conditions within Moscow’s perceived spheres of influence, and a preference for confirmatory analysis that suppresses unwelcome assessments. Drawing on archival material, former practitioner accounts, leaked reporting, and contemporary investigations, the article shows how these recurrent patterns generate strategically consequential misperceptions and repeatedly force Moscow from intelligence-led strategies of low-cost control into prolonged military escalation. The findings challenge depictions of RIS omnipotence and highlight the historical continuity of structural limitations that constrain Russian intelligence effectiveness across disparate conflicts, periods, and technologies.
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| Highly cited | No |
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