A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2436474
AutoresFacundo M Alonso (0000-0003-1024-1898)
Año2016
Volumen2
Número2
Páginas271-302
Fecha de publicación2016-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Social Ontology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2196-9663 • E-ISSN: 2196-9655
EditorialWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/jso-2015-0024
OpenAlexW2515662914
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas38

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals - including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance - which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations

Dual (grammatical number · Epistemology · Interpersonal communication · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy · Social Psychology