A Two-Step Theory of the Evolution of Human Thinking
Joint and (Various) Collective Forms of Intentionality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2436485 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Glenda Satne (0000-0001-5266-1407, University of Wollongong, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 105-116 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-23 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Social Ontology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2196-9663 • E-ISSN: 2196-9655 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/jso-2015-0053 |
| OpenAlex | W2328093203 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 11 |
Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an 'essential tension' (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: while sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello's two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Perspective (graphical · Sociality · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Artificial Intelligence · Ecology
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |