Historia de La Corrupción En El Perú

This book is exhaustively researched in archival and secondary sources. Alfonso Quiroz offers a fresh methodological analysis of Peruvian history that could also apply to other “developing countries.” He combines strong narrative with econometric calculations. Public corruption exists in all countries, but some societies are more successful than others in curtailing improbity. Constant vigilance is required. Corruption has negative socioeconomic consequences that affect economic development. Peruvian corruption has its roots in the patrimonial colonial society and is closely linked to the patron-client system (patronazgo). Under patronazgo, a group benefits itself via the patron. In Peru and Latin America, patronazgo and corruption are linked to the executive branch of the government: viceroys, caudillos, presidents, and dictators. Under patronazgo flourished networks of politicians and entrepreneurs who used the state apparatuses to traffic in all sorts of illegal activities for profit. Bureaucratic corruption involved civilians and the military. Military corruption was usually related to the purchase of weapons and equipment. Quiroz observes that many bureaucrats assumed that illegal enrichment was a natural activity. It was an opportunity to sell favors and public resources and to charge commissions. But there were critical voices who protested the damage that corruption caused to society. Unfortunately, they were mostly ignored.During colonial times, the viceroy required percentages of the illegal profits made by the bureaucrats under his jurisdiction. The size of the fees depended on the greed of the viceroy and how big his family or entourage was. It was estimated that during the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Lima elites smuggled about 100 million silver pesos with the help of French smugglers. And there were other foreign traffickers. Public corruption is a transnational business. Foreign connections facilitated the legalization of capital. In the late colonial period, the crown tried to improve mining and fiscal revenues, but bureaucrats, merchants, and miners forced the viceroy to suspend mercury sales on credit from Huancavelica in 1804. Eight years later, the Huancavelica mine was closed and mercury was imported from Spain. The mercury business was deadly and dangerous in multiple ways.The wars of independence disrupted exports of precious metals. Even before independence was accomplished, the liberators imposed forced loans and confiscations. With diminishing fiscal revenues, the source of illicit fortunes drastically declined. The new rulers resorted to foreign loans. It became a collusion of interests between foreign financiers, speculators, and local elites. But in 1825, Peru went bankrupt and lost its international credit. Thus the public debt became officially internationalized in the fledgling national state.After the disruption of mining production, the export of guano exploded in the 1840s. The government consolidated and paid the exaggerated debt claims. The state was affluent enough to pay speculators and extortionists. But Peru regained its creditworthiness. It has been argued that despite the corruption in the consolidation of the debt, a native capitalist class was created. Quiroz does not accept such an interpretation and correctly asserts that these capitalists contributed very little to the development of internal capital markets.The local elites are prone to use nationalist banners against foreign capital. In reality, foreign capital allies itself with different local elites. When the Peruvian government in 1869 regarded the public debt as unmanageable, it granted to the company Dreyfus Frères et Cie. (Paris) the exclusive right to market guano in Europe. In exchange, the company serviced the consolidated foreign debt. The so-called national capitalists accused the government of selling out to foreigners. In reality, they were selling out to an alliance of Dreyfus with Peruvians led by Nicolás de Piérola. In the extravaganza of easy money, the most expensive railroads in the world were built, and Peru again became greatly indebted. Piérola's search for personal power led Peru to bankruptcy.The patronazgo did not necessarily mean that presidents were corrupt, but the client relationships made the office of the president corrupt. Presidents like Fernando Belaúnde, Alan García, and Alberto Fujimori began their governments promising to fight corruption. They all ended up immersed in immense corruption. Alas, President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero was considered too honest to be a politician. The corruption costs for the decade of the 1980s were about one billion dollars annually. According to Quiroz, Fujimori's government was the most corrupt in Peruvian history. His main adviser and unofficial chief of intelligence Vladimiro Montesinos inherited over 1,600 corruption networks from García, which he systematized, enlarged, and refined. Montesinos actually paid Fujimori a monthly salary from the corruption revenues. Fujimori's brother-in-law and ambassador to Japan Víctor Aritomi became the conduit for the family valuables out of Peru. Institutional corruption moves in cycles along with export booms. By researching corruption, Quiroz has written a new narrative of Peruvian history. It is a point of departure for students of Peru, corruption, and economics

Bureaucracy · Colonialism · Development economics · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Jurisdiction · Language change · Latin Americans · Military government · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · History and Politics in Latin America · Law