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The Political Economy of Revolution and Democracy

Toward a theory of Latin American Politics

Bibliographic Data

ID2807616
AuthorsWilber A Chaffee (Saint Mary's College of California, corresponding author)
Year1984
Volume43
Issue4
Pages385-398
Publication date1984-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9246 • E-ISSN: 1536-7150
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1536-7150.1984.tb01863.x
OpenAlexW1785626815
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited8

Electoral democracy and revolutionary violence are both forms of political competition involving leaders vying for public office. Political leaders seek benefit from public position. By redefining those benefits into concepts of profit and costs, a rational choice framework can give an ordering of those types of political competition which are of the greatest value to officeholders, assuming that they are profit-maximizers. The ordering that result conforms to the definition of prisoner's dilemma and creates a game theoretic matrix based on leader's choices of either electoral or violent competition. The result is an explanation of various modes of political competition. The analysis draws on experimental work on prisoner's dilemma and on empirical material drawn from Latin American politics. Revolution, democracy, and dictatorship are shown to be varieties of a basic cost-benefit analysis of political leaders

Competition (biology) · Democracy · Dictatorship · Dilemma · Economic system · Economics · Game theory · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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Unique citing works1
Citations per year0,03
Citation span1986 - 1986 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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