Militarism, Ethnicity, and Politics in the Sierra Norte de Puebla, 1917-1930
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2834718 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael J Gonzales (Northern Illinois University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 160-162 |
| Publication date | 2005-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Hispanic American Historical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0018-2168 • E-ISSN: 1527-1900 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00182168-85-1-160 |
| OpenAlex | W2064737373 |
| Language | EN |
Keith Brewster provides us with the fascinating story of Gabriel Barrios, cacique of the Sierra Norte de Puebla from 1917-1930, whose “Indian battalion” pacified and stabilized a remote area during a period of political turmoil. Brewster sees Barrios as a politico-cultural power broker who mediated issues of revolutionary politics, patronage, and firepower between his largely Indian clients and mestizo politicians in Puebla City and Mexico City, including presidents. Barrios was neither an agrarian reformer in the mold of Saturnino Cedillo in San Luis Potosí nor a radical with a socialist agenda, as was Felipe Carrillo Puerto in the Yucatán. Rather, he was a pragmatic strongman who provided his clients with security, federal funds for development projects, and political and military representation. He secured crucial military support in the region for presidents Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elias Calles at a time when strongmen in Puebla City were preoccupied with personal feuds. For this, Barrios earned political capital from national leaders, whose authority was challenged by powerful rivals. In turn, he used this influence to provide security and resources to local campesinos when no one else could.Brewster explicitly seeks an interpretative middle ground between those who advocate the importance of popular political agency and those who favor the significance of top-down, patron-client relationships, although his evidence leans more toward the latter viewpoint. In general terms, this perspective has kinship with Alan Knight’s characterization of the “serrano” leader who fought during the revolution to protect the autonomy and prerogatives of his home turf against the intrusion of outsiders.Gabriel Barrios was the direct political heir of Juan Francisco Lucas, the cacique of the Sierra Norte de Puebla during the previous generation, whose career has been studied by Guy Thomson and David LaFrance. Barrios represented a bicultural puzzle to indigenous campesinos and mestizo politicians. Although he appeared biologically Indian and spoke Nahuatl better than Spanish, natives logically considered him a mestizo because of his cultural and political linkages with outsiders. Mestizos, influenced by prejudice and stereotypes, labeled him an Indian based on his appearance, manners, and unpolished Spanish. Nevertheless, Barrios’s ability to move within both cultural worlds provided him with broad political influence, particularly in the absence of viable alternatives. Central to Brewster’s argument is that campesinos and politicians alike were motivated primarily by pragmatism, as opposed to ideology. Barrios was viewed by both the downtrodden and the powerful as someone who could address their immediate concerns centered on military and political security.Barrios had a knack for siding with the winning side in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary struggles that divided the nation, which helps to explain his political longevity. In 1913, he sided with local Carrancistas in their victorious struggle against Victoriano Huerta. In 1920 he supported Alvaro Obregon over Venustiano Carranza, and in 1924 he helped Plutarco Elias Calles defeat Adolfo de la Huerta. Each time, Barrios’s “Indian Battalion” secured contested territory in the Puebla highlands for the victor’s side, which earned him federal funds and political protection in Mexico City against his rivals in Puebla City. Barrios’s political and military influence was limited, however, by his decision to confine military operations to his home turf and by his inability to gain the governorship, which would have given him access to greater financial and political resources. These limitations made him more dependent on the patronage of Mexico City and limited his autonomy, notably in comparison with contemporary regional caciques such as Saturnino Cedillo, Emilio Portes Gil, and Adalberto Tejeda.From 1920 to 1928, 15 different politicians occupied the governor’s mansion in Puebla City, and in the midst of this chaos Barrios’s army represented stability and security. He enjoyed the support of such diverse political personalities as Marxist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who won a disputed election as federal deputy from Puebla with Barrios’s support, and the entrepreneurial general Juan Andreu Almazan. Lombardo Toledano used his influence in Mexico City to help oust Barrios’s main rival, governor Claudio Tirado, and Almazan officially cleared Barrios of accusations, leveled by Tirado, that he had incited Indians to rebel.Throughout the 1920s, Barrios controlled the Sierra Norte de Puebla by dispensing justice and patronage in the absence of reliable public authority. Barrios ordered his men to hunt down and execute suspected criminals, even those guilty of nothing worse than stealing chickens, and to patrol the highways to make travel and commerce secure. As a rule, Barrios supported federal initiatives that he could control, such as public works programs, but viewed those administered by outsiders as intrusions on his personal control, including agrarian reform.Barrios assumed a particularly active role in orchestrating federally funded road and railway construction in his region. He dispensed funds (surviving accusations of embezzlement) and organized Indian labor gangs to do the work. His position as middleman in these projects helped prolong his cacicazgo. Brewster notes that Barrios’s mobilization of Indian labor into work crews brought him into conflict with local elites over access to native labor. This interesting observation left me wanting to know about Barrios’s rivalry with local elites, the nature of the regional economy, the occupational and residency patterns of campesinos, and popular demand for agrarian reform. In an agricultural region, did Barrios’s opposition to land redistribution cost him political support among landless campesinos? Moreover, did campesinos agree to work on road construction because they received good wages, because they were compelled to do so through coercion, or from a sense of political loyalty to their cacique? And were Barrios’s soldiers deployed to protect work crews, as Brewster says, or did they serve to prevent them from running away?Gabriel Barrios is remembered today by the people of the Sierra Norte de Puebla as a just and strong leader, although local heroes sometimes grow grander as historical details blur into collective memory. Brewster’s solid political biography of this important regional leader, based on oral history, as well as research in regional and national archives, contributes to our growing knowledge of the revolutionary process in the 1920s and provides insights into layered relationships between regional strongmen, their political constituents, and national leaders. Brewster’s observations on the political significance of Barrios’s ambiguous cultural identity are compelling, and he touches upon larger interpretive questions concerning popular political agency and patron-client relations
Ethnic group · Ethnology · Geography · Militarism · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Anthropology · Gender Studies · Indigenous Cultures and History · Indigenous Cultures and Socio-Education · Politics and Society in Latin America
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |