Plantinga on Properly Basic Belief in God
Lessons From the Epistemology of Perception
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3117589 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeremy Randel Koons (0000-0002-5492-348X, Georgetown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 245 |
| Pages | 839-850 |
| Publication date | 2011-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.709.x |
| OpenAlex | W1909267859 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Plantinga famously argues against evidentialism that belief in God can be properly basic. But the epistemology of cognitive faculties such as perception and memory which produce psychologically non-inferential beliefs shows that various inferentially justified theoretical beliefs are epistemically prior to our memory and perceptual beliefs, preventing the latter from being epistemically basic. Plantinga's analogy between the sensus divinitatis and these cognitive faculties suggests that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis cannot be properly basic either. Objections by and on behalf of Plantinga to this argument are considered
Belief in God · Epistemology · Epistemology of Wikipedia · Perception · Social epistemology · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.27 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2017 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |