Trans-world causation

Bibliographic Data

ID3175451
AuthorsEduardo García-Ramírez (0000-0002-9651-3315, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume62
Issue246
Pages71-83
Publication date2012-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00001.x
OpenAlexW2090942493
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited3

According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans‐world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans‐world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans‐world counterfactuals in a non‐trivial way that can make them come out to be true, by appealing to relations of comparative similarity among concrete possible worlds (i.e., assuming modal realism). I argue that either merely making such sense of a relevant counterfactual is not enough to have causation, or that Lewis’ modal realism must be given up

Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Metaphysics · Modal · Possible world · Realism · Similarity (geometry) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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