Not to Know What One Knows
Some Paradoxes of Self-Deception
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3187609 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Jean‐pierre Dupuy (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 169 |
| Pages | 53-68 |
| Publication date | 1995-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Diogenes (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0392-1921 • E-ISSN: 1467-7695 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/039219219504316907 |
| OpenAlex | W1974022686 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The problem of lying to, or deceiving oneself is currently one of the most debated in analytical philosophy. Now, since analytical philosophers are aware that Sartre defined "bad faith" as lying to oneself, as self-deception, and since moreover they find relatively coherent arguments in Sartre's text, they do not hesitate to include these arguments in their debates, if only to contest them. "To be dead is to be a prey for the living," one reads in Being and Nothingness (p. 695). One imagines Sartre rolling over in his grave. For this philosophy of mind is truly the Other of Sartre's philosophy. Yet, at the price of a treacherous translation, this philosophy gets something from Sartre, and perhaps gives him something in return.In a slightly surreal, perhaps even monstrous way, I am going to make the two philosophies engage in a dialogue on the problem of lying to oneself
CONTEST · Deception · Epistemology · Faith · Lying · Nothing · Self-deception · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2014 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |