Why Some Persistent Problems Persist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3188352 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Powell (0000-0003-2768-0555, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 980-996 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055419000364 |
| OpenAlex | W2963518779 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 26 |
Recent work on counter-insurgency, client states, foreign aid, and proxy wars uses a principal-agent framework to study the principal's ability to induce an agent to exert effort on the principal's behalf. This work broadly emphasizes the moral hazard problem and the actors' limited commitment power. The latter is usually addressed through the logic of repeated games in which reneging on an agreement triggers future punishment. This study analyzes a related incentive problem that undermines the principal's ability to induce an agent to exert effort on its behalf. The repeated-game's enforcement mechanism tends to break down if the principal is trying to get the agent to resolve a problem that, if resolved, (i) creates an ongoing problem for the agent and (ii) simultaneously significantly reduces the agent's ability to impose future costs on the principal. The principal cannot induce the agent to exert much effort in these circumstances, and the problem persists
Computer security · Corporate governance · Economics · Enforcement · Incentive · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political science · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Proxy (statistics · Punishment (psychology · Computer Science · Finance · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Forgotten Front
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
A Theory of Political Transitions
Friends Like These
Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency
Small footprint, small payoff
On the Economic Origins of Democracy
Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations
Between the Stools
The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
Rationalist explanations for war
War as a Commitment Problem
The Empiricists' Insurgency
How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
A Political Theory of Foreign Aid
The Inefficient Use of Power
| Citations per year | 0.83 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |