Deflationism and the Success Argument

Bibliographic Data

ID3197643
AuthorsNic Damnjanovic (Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume55
Issue218
Pages53-67
Publication date2005-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00384.x
OpenAlexW1977899154
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited6

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal–explanatory property. However, the now familiar ‘success argument’ attempts to show that truth plays an important causal–explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal–explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal–explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one

Argument (complex analysis) · Coherence theory of truth · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Logical consequence · Logical truth · Pragmatic theory of truth · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Property (philosophy) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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