Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis

Bibliographic Data

ID3197900
AuthorsW E S Mcneill (University of York), Will McNeill (0000-0002-3647-0720, University of York, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume62
Issue248
Pages569-591
Publication date2012-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00065.x
OpenAlexW2005500833
LanguageEN
Citations received15

The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non‐inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features it claims we see are suitably embodied. Call this Embodied Perception Theory. I argue that Embodied Perception Theory is false. It doesn't follow that the Perceptual Hypothesis is implausible. The considerations which serve to undermine Embodied Perception Theory serve equally to undermine the motivations for assuming that others' mental lives are always imperceptible

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Embodied cognition · Epistemology · Mental image · Mental representation · Perception · Perceptual system · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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