Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3201825 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Grace Helton (0000-0003-3729-5415, Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 271 |
| Pages | 243-264 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqx051 |
| OpenAlex | W2772685459 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 68 |
I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.
Animacy · Argument (complex analysis) · Attribution · Cognitive psychology · Illusion · Optical illusion · Perception · Stimulus (psychology) · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity
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| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,71 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |