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The dilemmas of open space

The future of the WSF

Bibliographic Data

ID3205568
AuthorsImmanuel Wallerstein (Yale University, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume56
Issue182
Pages629-637
Publication date2004-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Social Science Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-8701 • E-ISSN: 1468-2451
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0020-8701.2004.00522.x
OpenAlexW1969630246
LanguageEN
Citations received16

The World Social Forum (WSF) seeks to bring together, in its own words, all those who oppose “neo-liberal globalisation” and “imperialism in all its forms”. It hopes to serve as their common meeting-ground. It has adopted as its principal mode of operation the concept of the “open space”. This concept is highly original; it is also quite controversial among the participants of the WSF itself. We need to explore the origins of this concept of the “open space” and the reasons why it arouses so much fervour–both of those who are favourable to it and of those who are quite uneasy about it. And we need to explore the dilemmas the concept poses to the viability of the WSF itself. The story starts a long time ago. The year 1848 was a turning-point in the history of modes of opposition to the existing world-system. It was a year of two kinds of revolution. There was the social revolution in France, the first serious attempt by a movement which claimed a base in the urban working class to obtain political power. It was a serious attempt, but a political failure. It actually lasted only four months, and led in a convoluted manner to the seizure of power by Napoleon's nephew, who in 1852 proclaimed himself Emperor of France, and ruled for two decades. This failure of a social revolution led to a re-evaluation of political strategies all across the political spectrum of Europe–from right to centre to the left. The second revolution, or rather series of revolutions, was the attempt to proclaim national, popular sovereignty in a number of European countries–most notably Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Poland. Historians came to speak of 1848 as the “springtime of the nations”. These revolutions too were failures, in the sense that in none of these countries did the groups leading the revolutionary activities achieve (at least in any immediate term) political power. Their failures too led also to a re-evaluation of political strategies. Out of the failures of 1848 came a real impetus for the two kinds of movements–what came to be called the social movements and the national movements–to develop a political strategy based first and foremost on long-term organisation (as opposed to sporadic and “spontaneous” political action). These movements faced new and more efficacious opponents. The liberal centre had been frightened by what had happened in 1848 and made two shifts in its long-term strategy. It toned down its post-1789 conflict with the conservatives in the interests of presenting a common front against the more radical groups. But it also began to develop tactics that would appease some of the complaints put forward by the radicals without doing anything that would basically threaten the institutions of the world-system. The conservative right also changed its politics. It too had been frightened by the strength of the radical forces, and decided that its rigid opposition to all change might have been counterproductive. It therefore began to be seduced by the argument of the liberal centre that timely, but non-threatening, concessions had merit as a political tactic. The result was that, after an initial post-1848 period of acute repression of antisystemic forces, the major governments moved towards a politics of measured concessions. These new policies were in fact largely implemented not by the liberal centre whose idea they had been but by those who came to be called the “enlightened conservatives”– notably, Disraeli, Napoleon III, and Bismarck. In response, the weak, but slowly growing, antisystemic organisations engaged in a major internal debate about long-term strategy. The key question was the attitude these movements should assume in relation to the state machineries. Within both types of movements, there were those who insisted that, at least in the medium term, the state machineries were going to remain important, and that therefore acquiring state power was a necessary prerequisite to any kind of social transformation. Within the social movement, this was the position of the Marxists, and within the national movement, this was the position of the political nationalists. On the other side of the debate were those who were sceptical of any participation whatsoever in state operations (voting, running for office, accepting positions in the government). This group saw such participation as futile, diverting, and coopting. Within the social movement, this was the position of the anarchists, and within the national movement this was the position of the cultural nationalists. They saw their locus of action outside of, and most often against, the state. The short version of subsequent world political history is that this debate within the movements was essentially won by those who argued in favour of taking power within the states. The policy was summed up in the so-called two-step strategy: first obtain state power, then transform the world. And while such a strategy might have seemed to observers in 1860 a bit quixotic, the fact is that, a century later between 1945 and 1968, the first step of the two-step strategy turned out to be spectacularly successful throughout the world. In virtually every country, the antisystemic movements came to state power. A third of the world was governed by Communist parties. A second third of the world, the pan-European world, saw social-democratic parties (or their equivalents) come to power. To be sure, in these states, it was so-called alternating power, but they exercised this power in a situation in which the conservative opposition had accepted the basic idea of the social-democrats, the welfare state, and were merely arguing about its extensiveness. And the final third of the world, the South, saw national liberation movements come to power in most of Asia and Africa, and populist movements in Latin America. In short, the antisystemic movements had indeed obtained state power. The problem was that the movements seemed unable to implement effectively the second step, transforming the world. This is the essential explanation of the world revolution of 1968. In country after country – in all three zones of the world-system – there were uprisings of various sorts. One common feature of all these uprisings was the accusation of the revolutionaries against the “Old Left”: you promised social transformation when you came to power; you have not delivered on your promise. The world, they said, remains deeply inegalitarian, worldwide and within our countries; our political systems are not really democratic; there exists a privileged caste (a nomenklatura) within our regimes. Far less has changed than you said would change. The various uprisings of 1968 (really 1966–1970) were all put down. But the disillusionment that had bred them would not be erased. The subsequent three decades saw the downfall, one by one, of most of the regimes that had been put into power in the heyday of the antisystemic movements. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was merely the symbolic apex of this rejection of the “Old Left” regimes. The problem after 1968 for the world's antisystemic forces was how to reconstruct themselves, and most particularly how to revise their historic political strategy. There were at least three different kinds of revised strategies that were tried in the subsequent thirty years. The first was the multiple “Maoisms”. These groups emerged virtually everywhere. They were “Maoist” in the sense that they took the Chinese Cultural Revolution as a sort of model of their action. They criticised the “Old Left” for having failed to be sufficiently revolutionary, at the very least for having allowed themselves to be co-opted into the system, at the most of having betrayed their followers. Most of these movements splintered into many factious sects, and fell apart. They were then seriously undermined by the collapse of the Cultural Revolution in China itself. Nowhere did such movements achieve the political strength that the Old Left had shown in many parts of the world in the period 1945–1968. The second revised strategy was that which came to be called the “New Left”. This is a label that is often used to cover the new more militant feminist movements, the various Green movements, the assertive movements representing ethnic minorities or indigenous populations, those organised to pursue the rights of persons whose sexual preferences are different from the traditional heterosexual norms, and those who defend the rights of persons who had been previously considered “disabled” in one way or another. This is a variegated assemblage. What united these movements were three complaints about the Old Left which they all shared. First, they argued the urgency of political changes which the Old Left had previously thought secondary or considered to concern problems that would be (easily) solved after the main “revolution” had succeeded. The New Left movements argued that the kind of issues they raised were just as important and immediate as those which had been traditionally supported by the social movement (the rights of industrial workers) or the national movement (the rights of oppressed nationalities). The second thing that the New Left movements had in common was their objection to the centralising tendencies of the Old Left movements which, previously, had always insisted that, if special groups within the state were to be organised, it should only be as affiliates of the main Old Left movement, such as a women's or youth auxiliary. The Old Left movements had always argued that organising such movements separately was divisive and harmful to the “main” struggle that they incarnated. The third objection of the New Left movements was to the state-oriented strategy of the Old Left. New Left movements were divided between those who felt that they should proclaim anew the position of the earlier opponents of the Old Left (the anarchist / cultural nationalist segments) and denounce any orientation to state activity, and those who merely asserted that the state-oriented strategy was exaggerated, or omitted issues with which they were particularly concerned. It was this last debate that ultimately undid the “newness” of the New Left position. The story is best illustrated by the historic debate between the Realos and the Fundis that took place in the 1980s within the German Green movement, one of the most powerful expressions of a New Left movement. What happened is that the German Greens replicated the late nineteenth-century debate of the social movements on the issue of orientation to state action. The so-called Realos took a position analogous to that of the Marxists, and the so-called Fundis took one analogous to that of the anarchists. And once again, the state-oriented faction won. But thereupon, the biggest single difference between the New Left and the Old Left disappeared, especially since the surviving Old Left organisations had essentially given way on the first two objections of the New Left movements. In the 1980s, a third strategy began to gain strength, centring around the issue of “human rights”. The groups that subscribed to it started from the premise that the Old Left had seriously neglected the issues of human rights in their struggle for state power, and even more in their practice following the achievement of state power, when the governments in power actually violated such They to themselves as the feature of which was a of a a that more or less the and whose activities were to and action at the of the and were among the of such but their number is The of these organisations is that their activities led them into to and therefore if not actually the of their more they came to be in the countries of the (the locus of activities by these as one more of in their by institutions of the (the of such which that and in the these movements have not at state power, they to have been to a political to state power at all its and This is the that to what the world has called the and these to in other than an movement. did it to There are three symbolic of this movement, all of which in the the of the in in the against the of the World in and the first of the World Social Forum in in The of the was on the first of operation of the The emerged as the organised of the indigenous of their struggle for their and their out about the It rights for the indigenous it did not to obtain state power in It its within the worldwide of the struggle against the symbolic to their of on the into It and very for its in a for movements in the world. The came on the of what was to be a of the World It had The was as one against and the institutions to implement what had been called for a at least the It It was the of an between Old Left movements as the the New Left movements as and anarchist groups. The were from the And this might have been since the was in the it that have a popular base even in the and was more than a movement or even in the And the in its immediate against all The was effectively and the was unable to its was by activities of world in the world, to the that the of such began to to for or political it would be to (the in in the in in the in and of the of the World Forum in It is at this that a in by the and it was decided to the World Social Forum as a to the World Forum of The first such in in the of was for two main by the and the fact that it was a in the South, a major for the in its The WSF more in and then in in It in in and it has that in it in The number of participants has are to it to have from around participants in to in The WSF is a it adopted the of “open space”. The of this concept is that single political within the other than its to opposition to and in all its The WSF as such and political it has much less a of It have a in and a of popular the WSF in there was also an And it have an with organisations that have been co-opted and which at least once a year more to on such as the of and the that such In there have come to be national, and so-called social which are organised and which have of their to the the of the WSF themselves are actually an of – some some a very number of organised from the persons who a and it to the organising but then all the of and The of a and the of organisations to their own is what is when one that the World Social Forum has a rather than a The WSF is not a movement. It is not even a movement of movements. It is more as a of movements. And this seeks to be there remain in the of participation of different parts of the world, the WSF is more than any historic of antisystemic movements. In the not have the in its that it has always had in the in world antisystemic And a to groups is a for the at one the WSF be said to be an In a short it has in and It has to obtain the of the world as a to the much and World It has the locus of antisystemic in the world-system. there is a sense of about its among its most There are three main kinds of that it The first from the world some of have WSF even they are not to its This group that the WSF is not or in its The that the WSF should be engaged in to with the World Forum and the various institutions (the the World the which would in some way from the of so-called and This group that the WSF is too in and to even groups. It is that the WSF has all that it down the of with those at after one initial the WSF has not been to in with the (a made The WSF has always felt that such are of and in them would only the and of the WSF as a world The WSF is an but only for those who are opposed to and in all its It is very that one many participants in who would be to from this A more of the WSF has come from various groups that are of the Old Left. at a group of from but some from organised a sort of on the premise that the WSF had been basically to and was a This group to in the There are also within the WSF who this if in a more The of this group are The WSF world is it should that is the The WSF is an therefore it is but a It in therefore it is It from and it has It not political parties to it out key groups. It not groups engaged in to but is for oppressed groups who have the initial about the WSF are The shown after the are by it. There is also the of some and of persons by the anarchist It is the of this Old Left It is that the WSF a new with a who the important But in the this the as the Old Left The of the WSF are their to out the The last of from within the World Social Forum itself. In a the internal are of the outside of the the Old and the anarchist groups. In there are two of from within the The first is that, while the idea of be after a while it after the are of the and the And the second is that, while the idea of a be important are in fact and The that there is of the and therefore it on the there is one internal to there is so much for some organisations have within the of the world And these groups in their own adopted and political But the world have it to these from the WSF itself. these to the concept that the WSF as such political positions or action. There is an The internal have up a of debate within the World Social and within its especially at its in This led to a throughout the of organisations in the WSF by the which that the WSF is important changes in the of the WSF in It is this The starts by the basic the which is of the we would to transform the WSF into a that is of and common among different participants who come in the The a of and of such that the of the from the and not based on any of the or the They this as a in the This new is to the of internal in the of the as as the sense that there have been for among persons of the of the We in the to which this new these What is at least as important as internal for the of the is the within which the WSF To that, we the within the world There three major two and one basically among the major the and the struggle about the of the world-system that from the existing of the They have their own but the of is with those of the other The first is that among the three major of the of the so-called the and They are in acute with a that is the has into the political and has a major of We have moved the of The is a power, even in the (as the in has been and on any of from its in and quite the The is into a position it have to major concessions to and Asia if it to obtain their in the Within a the have to between and Asia in to with the locus of This a in world The second is the between and In this the three of the the But while they common interests in relation to the South, their with other have some in the struggle and the South, especially the countries in the power. the of of the South, the major issue is the so-called and the so-called the countries in the and the and in fact remain with or they to pursue to the of the there is the between the of the of and the of the of This is a that is not but and by class This is by the most important of the three the one that least in the The problem for the of the of is the to which they by the of the other two and they by their the of the other two rather than by The conflict between and is not about the and of this is how it is often by the participants in both groups. It is not about as a since as a world is in and in the years. The conflict is about what the as an It is about we in the of a different that one feature of inegalitarian, of a new world that is This is And on side have the and of the new world been with much the the is one of not of But in this there is question that the only serious of the forces that the of is the World Social Forum itself. And there is also question that there is to the key in this as What the of the to serve the of transforming the world in a that is and is and how the World Social Forum develop to an and political This not be and the promised for WSF in are merely a that the key to a is to and for multiple political and activities within the without any one of them an of the WSF itself. The should be a not only for the of and by its participants but for an the of modes of political action in the world is and was to an for The WSF only those who are opposed to and in all its This is a but from an There are for the The WSF should be an that not merely issues and of but the of by those who to These of action not only be different but different be some some some rather The WSF is doing of but it should within its between these different long as the debate remains between and not between of the such only the of the WSF in world transformation. The second key of is that it be that is There has been more in the of the WSF than is of the should be going on in a to This serve as a on those who they to the WSF and change its basic This serve as a to those who that we be a more world-system with a more One idea might be the of all of the and them on the This has the of but it has the of to what the are and their in to that it is by the WSF an that is the of multiple of political activities and also by a of the of the WSF itself. this be to the of the WSF and its in the world struggle for One be in the This is a and one that would need to be in years. It is quite that, in the of immediate in the world or of internal the World Social Forum should apart. not this but it is What of is that, at this there exists to the World Social Forum as a world on of those who struggle for the of or are in any way to the of a world-system. We the WSF or we down with it

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Unique citing works16
Citations per year0,76
Citation span2005 - 2025 (21)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 13

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