International Law and State Behavior
Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3207017 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Beth A Simmons (0000-0001-8207-713X, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 819-835 |
| Publication date | 2000-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2586210 |
| OpenAlex | W2103185416 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 278 |
| References cited | 59 |
Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely "enforcement" mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance
Business · Commit · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · International law · Law and economics · Political science · Reputation · Sovereignty · State (computer science · Corruption and Economic Development · International Arbitration and Investment Law · International Development and Aid · Law · Social Psychology
Committed to Rights
International Economic Institutions
The Political Economy of Exchange Rates
Scorecard Diplomacy
How International Law Works
When BITs have some bite
The International Monetary Fund
The politics of IO performance
Informal governance in world politics
Hello, goodbye
Compliance With International Law
Cooperation in World Politics
Contesting Revisionism
The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights
Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity
From International Relations to Global Society
Competing State Interests and the Strategic Use of Advisory Proceedings
Bilateral labor agreements as migration governance tools
Exploring institutional competence for effective anti-trafficking policy compliance
Thailand’s responses to asylum seekers
Governmental Capabilities and Responsiveness
The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence
The Shield of Nationality
Violence and Restraint in Civil War
Democracy from Above
Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization
Compliance with International Monetary Fund concessional lending policies and economic and social rights fulfillment
Breaking barriers
The globalization of childhood
Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise
International Human Trafficking
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others
It’s a Hard-Knock Life
Distributional effects of political power-sharing arrangements and their negative consequences for post-agreement stability
Promoting International Humanitarian Law
Human Rights as Reputation Builder
The Power to Blame as a Source of Leverage
The rational enforcement of international law
The limits of reputation on compliance
Domestic politics, reputational sanctions, and international compliance
International institutions
How international law works
Regulating Conflict
Rights, Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
Keeping Up With Which Joneses
Support from Above
Environmental agreement under the non-interference principle
The effects of treaty legality and domestic institutional hurdles on environmental treaty ratification
Does North America Have the Right Stuff? An Analysis of Compatibility and the Potential Deepening of North American Integration
Toward a New Sociology of Rights
Reaching Inside the State
The Unintended Consequences of Information Provision
Business and International Environmental Agreements
Differentiating compliance with international law
Rights Transmission by Mimesis
Does political ideology affect a government’s credit rating? The evidence on parties’ socio-cultural positions in European countries
Domestic political implications of global value chains
Domestic arbitral institutions and foreign direct investment
Securitizing small arms and light weapons in support of regional security
Striking a deal on the F-35
Compliance in Time
Rethinking Tests of the IO Effectiveness Hypothesis
Norm Collision
Signalling credibility? The IMF and catalytic finance
The IMF and civil society
Assessing the network power capacity of Informal International Governmental Organizations (Iigo)
New deals ‘The Second After Leaving?’ IO withdrawal and bilateral trade agreements
Enforcement of international human rights law
Sovereignty cost, terrorism and Türkiye’s reluctance to join the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Death Penalty Abolition and the Ratification of the Second Optional Protocol
Does ownership matter? Claimant characteristics and case outcomes in investor-state arbitration
Beyond burden-sharing
Unilateral Withdrawals from Multilateral International Treaties, 1945–2024
Russia, the death penalty, and Europe
Opening the black box of international human rights enforceability through the study of migrant rights
The new interdependence approach
Writing the rules of global finance
Managing and transforming policy stigmas in international finance
The politics of influence
Regulating globally, implementing locally
Indo-Pacific Powers
Signing Cedaw and Women’s Rights
Compliance
The Social Cost of International Investment Agreements
The Limits to Planning
Legal Systems and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes
Legal Systems and Variance in the Design of Commitments to the International Court of Justice
The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes
Human rights organizations and transitional justice agenda-setting
Issue linkage and international cooperation
The President and International Commitments
Policy innovation and tertiary education graduation rates
Bilateral Investment Treaties and FDI
Empty Promises and Nonincorporation in Mercosur
The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions
The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes
Imitation in International Relations
Improving Reputation BIT by BIT
International Trade and Domestic Legal Systems
Power Preponderance and Domestic Politics
How nations behave
Gatekeepers of Growth
Empowering Exporters
The New Sovereignty
Optimal Imperfection?
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade
Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation when the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is Weak
Alternative methods for evaluating the impact of interventions
Institutions and Economic Performance
Partisan Politics in the Global Economy
Cooperation among Democracies
The halse Promise of International Institutions
International Law in a World of Liberal States
International legal norms and the preservation of peace, 1820–1964
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
The False Promise of International Institutions
The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965. Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation
The dynamics of financial globalization
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement
Rules Rather than Discretion
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model
The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”
Improving Compliance with International Law
The Gold Standard As a Rule
The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965
Promises, Promises
The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965. Volume I
Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements
International Law and International Relations Theory
International Monetary Collaboration
Taking Time Seriously
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
Democracy and the Management of International Conflict
Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries
Law and Power in Military Intervention
Why are some international agreements informal
On compliance
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs
Taking Preferences Seriously
Compliance With International Agreements
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors
How Nations Behave. Law and Foreign Policy
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
Liberalism and World Politics
| Unique citing works | 278 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 11,12 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2026 (26) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 278 |