Freeing the Will from Neurophilosophy
Voluntary Action in Thomas Aquinas and Libet-Style Experiments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3210027 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel D De Haan (0000-0001-8656-3610, University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 662 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444 |
| Publisher | MDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.3390/rel15060662 |
| OpenAlex | W4399087465 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 45 |
This essay presents a substantive Thomist response to neurophilosophy's main experimental challenge to free will: the Libet-style experiments on the neural antecedents of conscious voluntary actions. My response to this challenge will disclose that Thomists are rationally justified in rejecting both the conclusions of neurophilosophy skeptics of free will, and more fundamentally, the rival philosophical conceptions of voluntary action and free will that were chosen to be operationalized in these neuroscientific experiments. I show how the Thomists' alternative conception of human action justifies a significantly different interpretation of Libet-style experiments, one which reveals the psychological phenomenon targeted by these experiments is miscategorized as a voluntary action
Epistemology · Free will · Linguistics · Operationalization · Perception · Phenomenon · Skepticism · Voluntary action · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments · Social Psychology
The Passions
Radicalizing Enactivism
Effective Intentions
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything
Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Essays on Anscombe's "Intention"
The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas
Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham
Action, Knowledge, and Will
Human Nature
Right Practical Reason
Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature
Self and Other
Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity
Essays on Actions and Events
Is Every Action Morally Significant
Atheism and theism
The Natural Philosophy of Agency
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |